Posts tagged: 'network security'
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The home network is equally important to secure as the organization you work for. Think about it, this is the network that you use when not in the office; you plug your work laptop in, access sites that are unfiltered/unprotected by your company’s proxy, and then bring the laptop back in to the office the next day and plug it in to the production network. This has the potential to introduce significant risk to the organization. This risk is only exacerbated if someone is able to compromise your home network. In fact, using work laptops outside of the company network is one of the most common ways malware makes it into the organization.
For these reasons it is important to take security seriously both inside and outside of the office. To help with this, I’ve put together 7 steps that you can take to improve the security of your home network.
1. Encrypt your home network using WPA2 and a strong password
Open wireless networks should be avoided unless there is no other option. When using open networks, a VPN should be employed to protect your data while in transit. When it comes to your personal home network, there is absolutely no reason to leave the wireless network open. Encryption is built in to every standard Wi-Fi router so there is absolutely no reason to not enable this. More importantly, Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2) should be used as it is the most secure Wireless protocol available for home use. WEP and standard WPA can be cracked and are not considered secure.
In addition to enabling encryption, a very strong password should be used. This doesn’t need to be something ridiculously hard to remember, or so complex that you need to write it down. Remember, when it comes to password strength it’s all about entropy. So, the longer the password the better. This could be something as simple as a sentence with a few capital letters, spaces, and maybe one special character. This makes it very hard to guess but easy to remember, and if someone is able to capture the challenge-response, it will be very difficult for them to crack.
2. Change default router passwords and settings
Just do it… This is the very first thing that every penetration tester will try once connected to a wireless network. If they can log in to the administrative interface using a default or easily-guessable password, then all bets are off. The same goes for default settings. The fact that they are ‘default’ means that they are generally public knowledge and a quick google search will give an adversary everything they need to gain access to your network.
Aside from passwords — which should be changed for obvious reasons, the main setting of concern is the default IP address. This is normally 192.168.x.1 and various exploit kits are hard-coded to take advantage of these default configuration settings. Simply changing the IP address to anything else (IE: 10.112.123.111) will greatly improve the security of the router and subsequently, your home network as a whole.
One other setting that should not be overlooked is Wireless Protected Setup (WPS). This feature is prone to well-known and simple proximity attacks and can be broken very easily. When using WPS to configure devices such as printers or similar technology, it is best practice to enable WPS, add the device, and then disable WPS once the device has associated with the access point.
3. Set up a guest network for family and friends to use when they visit
Guest networks are a simple and effective way to segment your devices from potentially untrusted devices on the network. Sometimes a friends system can contain malware that could infect other systems over the network. Or, if you have guests regularly (think Air BnB) that connect to your network, do you really want them to be able to access your computer, servers, or other systems on your personal network? Another aspect to consider if you have ‘untrusted guests’ is to lock the router away to deter physical access attacks.
Many routers have a built-in guest feature. If yours doesn’t support this, you may want to consider purchasing another cheap router and bridge this off of your normal access point. This segments the network and keeps untrusted devices off of the main network. This could also be key if someone uses your guest network to download torrents or perform other illegal activities, as showing that this was conducted over your guest network by a device that you don’t own could get you out of hot water.
4. Set up a separate network for Internet of Things (IoT) devices
If you can control your lights from the internet, so can anyone else who happens to guess the password to your Internet of Things control center. What’s worse is that if they can get to your lights, what else can they access on your network? With the rise in home automation and remote access to physical devices, it is important to segment the network to reduce the risk of an outsider gaining access to the internal network by way of an exposed service.
5. Disable remote access to your home network
Many routers come with the ability to allow remote access. This can be very dangerous, especially if default passwords are still in place. Once someone gains access to the router remotely, they can sniff traffic and access systems on the internal network from anywhere in the world. Often these technologies are only protected by a username and password, which can be easily broken with a dictionary attack, often without the owner even knowing. This is why it is very important to only enable remote services when you can compensate for the risks by adding protections such as multifactor authentication.
The same precautions should be taken when running a demilitarized zone (DMZ) and exposing Windows or Linux servers to the internet. Unless it is absolutely necessary to access these systems directly from the internet, a VPN with multifactor authentication should be used instead. This will allow you to access your home network remotely in a more secure manner. If you are running a web server or something similar and need to have these services directly exposed, any remote administration protocols such as RDP or SSH should be protected using a public/private key pair in addition to the username/password combination.
6. Use a firewall
Firewalls are a cheap and effective way to curb attacks against your home network. Plus, they give you additional insight into the traffic that is traversing over the network boundary, in addition to maintaining a separate record of traffic history. Firewalls can also be implemented on the router directly, in fact most modern routers come with the built in ability to block specific ports or even filter specific types of traffic. A really good one that I would highly recommend is pfsense.
If you are exposing servers to the internet, Honeyports are a free and easy to use tool can be used to detect and ban IP addresses as attacks are observed. Artillery is one of my favorite tools for this and it can be installed on the server and up and running in minutes. This will prevent known-bad IP addresses from reaching your server once a connection attempt has been made against one of the exposed Honeyport services.
7. Log out of the router when not using it
Many of the attacks against routers today are done by forcing the client to perform an action within the administrative interface of the router on behalf of the attacker. This attack is commonly referred to as Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) and is a very effective means of gaining access to a router. Some of the attacks simply enable remote access to the router and change the administrative password while others completely take over the device and backdoor it. For these reasons, it is important to always log out of the router’s web interface when you are done administering the services.
none | Security
If you are currently running any Drupal 7 web applications, there is a very critical SQL Injection vulnerability affecting Drupal Core. This was publicly released on Wednesday, 10/15/14 along with an exploit. The proof of concept simply modifies the administrator’s username and password, allowing an attacker to gain administrative access to the Drupal application.
“Drupal 7 includes a database abstraction API to ensure that queries executed against the database are sanitized to prevent SQL injection attacks.
A vulnerability in this API allows an attacker to send specially crafted requests resulting in arbitrary SQL execution. Depending on the content of the requests this can lead to privilege escalation, arbitrary PHP execution, or other attacks.
This vulnerability can be exploited by anonymous users.”
The vulnerability is ranked as Highly Critical, a 5 out of 5 on the Drupal Security Team’s risk scale… A patch has been released and upgrading to Drupal Core version 7.32 will remediate this vulnerability. If you host Drupal sites, it is imperative that you patch soon. One quick way to test and see what sites have yet to be patched would be to make a simple bash loop to check all the known Drupal sites in your environment and see if any of them are still vulnerable.
Be very careful doing this, it will modify the admin’s password on every vulnerable site!
Even though this was only publicly released just a couple days ago, there is a chance that this vulnerability has been known for quite some time as it affects every Drupal 7 web application running version 7.31 or older. Luckily there are log traces of this attack that can be used to ascertain whether or not the vulnerability has been exploited.
The evidence in question lies within the Drupal Watchdog logs. Ideally this information should be extracted and stored in a SIEM or similar central logging solution. However, if you are only moving server logs off of the host then you are missing a good portion of the actionable evidence. Not to mention that once an attacker has gained access they can simply clear out the logs, erasing all remnants of the attack within the application.
If you are not offloading these logs to a SIEM and are lucky enough to still have Watchdog logs available following a breach, then you should search through these for the following four events in succession. Sometimes there will only be the first three (from bottom to top) as the attacker may wait to actually log in.
The details of the three messages to look for are:
- Warning: mb_strlen() expects parameter 1 to be string, array given in drupal_strlen() (line 478 of /var/www/redman/includes/unicode.inc).
- Warning: addcslashes() expects parameter 1 to be string, array given in DatabaseConnection->escapeLike() (line 981 of /var/www/redman/includes/database/database.inc).
- Login attempt failed for .
The nice thing about this attack is that the logs consistently provide us with valuable data, making it very easy to create a correlated events on a successful attack. So, if you are unsure of whether or not all of the Drupal 7 sites have been adequately patched, it’s a good idea to alert the SOC to successful attacks against any Drupal applications in the environment. Using LogRhythm this can be done with a simple correlated event rule block that looks for these messages in quick succession. I’ve included an example rule below that simply looks for this activity within the Watchdog logs. The first of which alerts on the message data from the first portion of the attack within Drupal 7 UDLA logs…
The second rule block looks for the next error message in the Watchdog database table…
And the third rule block looks for a failed login with a [ blank username ].
All of which is grouped by the same Impacted Host.
You could also add a rule looking for a successful login using the admin account. However they could change the admin’s username and may not even log in for quite some time following a successful attack. For this reason I did not include the fourth potential log message in the rule.
If you have a WAF that is tuned properly, this attack should be blocked. The LogRhythm Web Application Defense Module can assist with detecting this attack as well. Due to the popularity of this CMS, many organizations currently have a very large number of Drupal applications and often have little control over when they get patched. For this reason, it is beneficial to now when these applications are successfully compromised at the very least. Alerting on this activity will allow the security team to make a business case to get the sites patched in a reasonable amount of time as the only true way to fix this issue is to upgrade to Drupal 7.32 as soon as possible.
Tricking users into copying different commands from what is displayed on a web page…
OK, maybe I’m late to this party but I recently came across a very cool attack vector that I had not heard about until now. There’s an excellent write up on this here that was actually published in 2008, so I won’t go through the details of how this works. However you can view an interactive demo of this in action here.
Essentially, this is ruse that can be used to trick people into running a different command on their system than what they thought they had initially copied from a website. Go ahead and try it out over at JSFiddle.net, just copy the text within the ‘result’ box and paste it into a text editor to review the full command. Neat, huh?!
The demo above shows an attempt to shovel a reverse python shell back to the attackers system though make it appear like the command simply echoed “this is a test” to the screen as expected. This proof of concept is demonstrated below.
This is merely another vector that can be leveraged in social engineering attacks. Demonstrating the risk with blindly copying + running commands from websites that you do not trust. Always re-type commands such as this or paste them into a text-editor prior to running them directly. Also, if you are cloning a repository from a resource such as GitHub, review the code before integrating this into your project. All too often websites are backdoored due to the themes or modules that have been downloaded and installed from an un-trusted repository without going through code-review. In general, you shouldn’t implicitly trust anything at face value; trust but verify…
Notice – LogRhythm nor the author of this blog post are liable for any illegal activities conducted with this information. LogRhythm does not condone or support such activity, this post is simply a proof-of-concept to explore the risks of open wireless access points.
Open wireless access points have always been a hot topic within the security community. Due to their nature, there are a plethora of attacks that allow hackers to breach these networks, mirror legitimate access points, man-in-the-middle traffic and much more. These attacks are conducted every day on many networks all over the planet. Hackers will leverage anything from the Wireless network at your local Starbucks, the airport, airplanes, hotel chains, personal guest networks, and more to steal personal information. You name it, someone out there has found a new way to exploit it. Still trust those pay-as-you-go WiFi hot spots that ask you to supply credit card information?
Which brings us to Comcast… They have been steadily implementing their plan to leverage their customers Comcast access points (only those owned by Comcast, not personal equipment) to distribute wireless access to any Comcast subscriber that happens to be in the vicinity.
“Comcast’s newest Wireless Gateway broadcasts two WiFi signals. By default, one is securely configured for the private use of the home subscriber. The second is a neighborhood “xfinitywifi” network signal that can be shared. This creates an extension of the Xfinity WiFi network and will allow visiting Xfinity Internet subscribers to sign in and connect using their own usernames and passwords.”
All you need to do is locate a nearby access point, log in using your Comcast credentials and start browsing the net through someone’s home router. There is a bit of controversy over this feature — however this is beside the point. What I’d like to talk about today is how hackers can leverage this
vulnerability feature for evil and why consumers should be wary of using open wireless access points in general.
To help illustrate this risk, I’ll be using the WiFi Pineapple — a great little device by the folks at Hak5 that most security professionals are familiar with. The Pineapple comes equipped with a myriad of tools to help trick clients into passing their traffic through this access point so that it can be sniffed, altered, modified, or worse. For our specific attack, we’ll be imitating an Xfinity WiFi access point and using this to steal users Comcast account credentials among other nefarious activities.
First, we need to obtain the code served up by one of these access points, learn how it works, and build our own version. Xfinity access points are popping up everywhere, so finding one is incredibly easy.
Upon finding an access point without even leaving my neighborhood, I cloned the code from the landing page, modified the HTML and added my own form processors to create two identical versions of the Comcast (standard and web) splash pages. This code can be downloaded here:
From here, this code can either be uploaded to the Pineapple or stored on a separate (internet-accessible) server if you’ve run out of free space on the Pineapple. For this walk through, we will host the code on the Pineapple itself. To keep this seperate from the other Pineapple tools, SSH into the Pineapple and make a new directory in the /www/ folder, we’ll call this folder ‘x‘.
Within the github repository, there are two landing page options. One is the default web landing page (login-page-option1) and the other is the default mobile landing page (login-page-option2). Either one will work or you can get creative and adjust the page displayed based on User Agent Strings.
With the folder in place, SCP the code from the xfinity-pineapple/login-page-option(1|2)/ directory to the new folder.
With the authentication page in place, we need to change the name of our access point to ‘xfinitywifi’ to mimic the legitimate Xfinity access point. This can be accomplished under the Karma Configuration menu.
Next, you will need to configure a redirect and force the user to log in. There are multiple ways to do this. The simplest option is to use the Pineapple DNSSpoof Infusion. This method will look for common keywords entered by the victim in the URI and redirect them to the Xfinity landing page. Going this route, they are more likely to catch on that something is up, especially when attempting to visit Google and it keeps redirecting them back to the Xfinity landing page…
The second and more believable option is to go with a captive portal. This allows you to pass the users through a splash page that you configure and force them to ‘authenticate’ before accessing the internet. Once the victim has ‘logged in’ successfully, they may now browse the internet. To accomplish this, you will need to install and enable the Evil Portal Pineapple Infusion.
Once the Evil Portal has been installed, open the module configuration page and follow the steps exactly as they are listed. Once you have installed the dependencies, made configuration changes, and tested to be sure that the splash page works, modify the /etc/nodogsplash/htdocs/splash.html page to reflect a false Xfinity portal. An example configuration page has been included within the Xfinity Pineapple Github repository and the splash page can be updated either through the Pineapple interface or via SSH. You may want to back up the original splash.html page at this point.
With the evil splash page configured to push users to the ‘authentication portal’ upon joining the access point, launch NodogSplash from the Pineapple interface and be sure to click ‘Start Once’ as this interface does have a tendency to hang. If it does hang, SSH to the Pineapple and run: killall nodogsplash.
With the configuration up and ready for users to connect through your access point, enable the wireless service on the Pineapple and verify that you show a newly available access point, ‘xfinitysifi’. Now sit back and watch as users join your access point and enter their Xfinity account credentials, which will be stored in the auth.log file. With these credentials, someone of lesser morals could use these to conduct illegal activities and have them traced back to the owner of the Comcast account. Not only that, but once the victim is browsing through the Pineapple, this is only the beginning…
You’ll notice that this file logs two password attempts, this is because the landing pages are configured to always fail the first attempt and act as though the second attempt was valid and pass them through to the internet. This was done on purpose to catch multiple authentication attempts in the event they miss-type them during one of the entries.
For bonus points, try setting up an evil Kali Linux access point using a Raspberry Pi for an even greater range of attacks when users connect. Depending on your home router’s configuration, you may even be able to set up a separate guest network as a false ‘xfinitywifi’ hotspot.
None of what we talked about here applies explicitly to Comcast, this can be done on any public access point, though stealing Comcast credentials does have the added advantage of providing attackers with credentials they can later use to mask their online activity. For this reason, users should take steps to protect themselves and be cautious when using these networks.
- First and foremost, Comcast customers can disable this feature if they are so inclined.
- If you have connected to an Xfinity access point in the past, you will pre-authenticate to any Xfinity access point going forward, this includes a masquerading Pineapple. This will not expose your credentials, but all your traffic will be passed through a potentially hostile access point.
- When not using WiFi on your phone / laptop / tablet, disable it, especially when in crowded areas such as an airport.
- When joining one of these access points, try to verify that one really does exist in this area using the Xfinity WiFi app on iOS/Android or by reviewing their Access Point Map.
- Real Xfinity access points will redirect you to https://wifilogin.comcast.net to authenticate, though this could also be fudged by an attacker using DNS Spoofing so it is not a dead giveaway. The real identifier here is that the legitimate landing page is using SSL and has a valid certificate. This can be spoofed as well, but is much harder.
- When connecting to any open Wireless network, use a VPN service to encrypt your traffic.
Then again, you can always just ask someone for their Comcast credentials…